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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND: AN UNPRECEDENTED USE
OF “PRIMARY” PURPOSE LEAVES WIDE OPEN THE DOOR FOR
“SECONDARY” PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION
8. EVERY VEHICLE BEING STOPPED MUST BE EXAMINED IN
THE SAME MANNER UNTIL PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION OR
PROBABLE CAUSE DEVELOPS.
THERE WILL BE NO
EXCEPTIONS! A DRUG DETECTION DOG WILL WALK AROUND
AND EXAMINE EVERY VEHICLE STOPPED AT THE
CHECKPOINT.
9. THERE WILL BE NO DISCRETION GIVEN TO ANY OFFICER TO
STOP ANY VEHICLE OUT OF SEQUENCE.
WHEN THE
SEQUENCE OF VEHICLES HAVE (sic) BEEN TOTALLY DEALT
WITH AND EITHER RELEASED OR SEIZED, THE VERY NEXT
SEQUENCE OF VEHICLES WILL BE STOPPED. NO VEHICLES
WILL BE PERMITTED TO PASS THE CHECKPOINT BEFORE
ANOTHER SEQUENCE IS STOPPED AFTER ALL VEHICLES IN
THE CURRENT SEQUENCE HAVE BEEN RELEASED OR SEIZED.1
Six times between August and November of 1998, the Indianapolis Police
Department set up checkpoints or drug interdiction roadblocks for the sole
purpose of catching drug offenders and “[interrupting] the flow of illegal
narcotics throughout Indianapolis.”2 Approximately thirty officers were
located at each checkpoint, along with patrol cars that contained mobile data
terminals.3 During each stop, which exceeded no more than five minutes, a
predetermined number of drivers were asked to present their driver’s licenses
and vehicle registration, while an officer peered into the car.4 At some point
during the stop, the police led a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of the

1. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (S.D. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter
Goldsmith I] (quoting selected portions of the Indianapolis Police Department’s (IPD’s) written
guidelines for drug interdiction checkpoints).
2. Id. at 1018; Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter
Goldsmith II].
3. Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1019. The purpose of the mobile terminals is to run a
search on invalid licenses and registrations at the checkpoint location. Id.
4. Id.; Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661.
175
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car, and upon an “alert” or indication from the trained dog, probable cause was
established.5 This program led to the stopping of 1,161 vehicles, which
resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests, “meaning that five percent of the total
number of stops resulted in successful drug ‘hits,’ and 49 arrests for conduct
unrelated to drugs, such as driving with an expired driver’s license, for an
overall hit rate of 9 percent.”6 Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer,
who were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint, filed a class action suit
against the City of Indianapolis and its Mayor, as well as unknown members of
the Indianapolis Police Department (hereinafter “State”). They represented
“any and all persons driving vehicles who have been stopped or [are] subject to
being stopped in the future at the drug interdiction roadblocks maintained by
the City of Indianapolis in an attempt to interdict and curtail unlawful drugs
and unlawful drug use.”7 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana denied Respondents’ motion for preliminary injunction, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the checkpoints “contravened the Fourth Amendment.”8 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.9
The fundamental principle of the Fourth Amendment requires that searches
and seizures be reasonable;10 however the Supreme Court has recognized
limited circumstances where the usual requirement of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause have been waived.11 To determine whether individualized
suspicion is required, the Court balances “the nature of the interests threatened
and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue.”12
Suspicionless searches have been upheld where the program was designed to
serve special needs,13 administrative purposes,14 a fixed border patrol
5. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661; Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
6. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661.
7. Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
8. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000).
9. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 4009 (U.S. Feb.
22, 2000) (No. 99-1030).
10. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
12. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43.
13. Id. at 37. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). The
increased use of drugs, particularly among student athletes, led the school district in Vernonia,
Oregon, to impose random drug testing of its student-athletes. Id. at 649. The Court took into
account several factors, including “the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative
unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search” and upheld
Vernonia’s school policy as “reasonable and hence constitutional.” Id. at 664-65. The Court
added:
We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass
constitutional muster in other contexts. The most significant factor in this case is . . . that
the policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care. Just as when
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the government conducts a search in its capacity as employer . . . the relevant question is
whether that intrusion upon privacy is one that a reasonable employer might engage in; so
also when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the
search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. [W]e conclude in the
present case it is.
Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
In National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the United States
Customs Service, largely responsible for seizing contraband, required its own employees seeking
transfer or promotion to certain positions involving the interdiction of illegal drugs to undergo a
drug test. Id. at 659-60, 679. The Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of the Service after
balancing “the public interest in the Service’s testing program against the privacy concerns
implicated by the test.” The Court also stated that “the Government’s compelling interests in
preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of
our Nation’s borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interest of those who seek
promotion in these positions . . . .” Id. at 679.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) set forth certain regulations mandating blood and urine tests of
employees involved in certain train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety
regulations. Id. at 606; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. The Court held that the
compelling Government interests served by the FRA’s regulations would be significantly
hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee. The necessity to perform that
regulatory function with respect to railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks,
and the reasonableness of the system for doing so, have been established in this case.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
14. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35-37. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-04
(1987). New York City Police Department, Auto Crimes Division, conducted a warrantless
inspection of a junkyard owner’s premises, in accordance with N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5
(McKinney 1986), and determined he was in possession of stolen vehicles and parts. Burger, 482
U.S. at 693-95. The Court upheld the inspection, finding that it fell within the “established
exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspection in ‘closely regulated’
businesses.” Id. at 703. The regulatory scheme satisfied the three criteria to make reasonable
warrantless inspections pursuant to the statute. Id. at 708. First, the State had a “substantial
interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling and automobile-junkyard industry” due to increased
motor vehicle theft in the State, and this theft is associated with the above industry. Id. Second,
the regulation of this industry “reasonably [served] the State’s substantial interest in eradicating
the automobile theft.” Id. at 709. Finally, the statute provided a “constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant.” Id. at 711 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), after the fire department stopped a fire in
Tyler’s Auction furniture store, other members of the department proceeded into the fire-damaged
premises “to determine the cause and make out all reports.” Id. at 502. Two plastic containers of
flammable liquid had been found in the building, and upon concluding that arson may have been
the cause of the fire, pictures of the containers and scene were taken, and the actual containers
were eventually seized by the fire department. The respondents challenged the introduction of the
containers at trial, as there was neither consent nor a warrant for any post-fire entry into the
building nor for the removal of the containers. Id. at 501. The Court found that a warrant was
not necessary for the re-entries because the initial investigation was severely hindered by
darkness, steam and smoke. Id. at 511. The morning re-entries were just a continuation of the
first, and the “lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence.” Id.
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checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens15 or check driver sobriety,16 and
the Court even suggested that a similar checkpoint whose purpose was to
verify drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration might also be permissible.17
Yet the Court has made it clear that it had never upheld, nor even indicated that
it might uphold, a checkpoint whose “primary purpose” was to detect general
criminal wrongdoing.18
While the Court pointed out another well-established principle—that
vehicle stops on the highway constitute a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment—the thrust of its opinion centered around the primary
purpose of checkpoint programs.19 Rejecting the State’s assertion that
precedent precluded an inquiry into the purpose of a checkpoint program
where a legitimate interest is pursued,20 the Court stated that such cases
reinforce the principle that “programmatic purposes may be relevant to the
validity of the Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general
scheme without individualized suspicion.”21 In response to the State’s
argument that its program ought to be justified by its lawful secondary
purposes of keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying drivers’
licenses and registrations, the Court noted that the importance of examining the
primary purpose was to prevent the police from establishing checkpoints for
nearly any purpose “so long as they also included a license or sobriety
check.”22

“[A]n entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and . . . once in the building, officials may remain
there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to
investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing
administrative searches.” Id. (citations omitted).
And in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), contrary to the above-cited
cases, the Court held that the routine annual inspection of an apartment building by an inspector
of the Division of Housing Inspection did not suggest compelling urgency, thus a warrant should
be sought if entry is refused. Id. at 539. “Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard
of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without
a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations.” Id. (citations omitted).
15. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
16. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
17. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
18. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
19. Id. at 40.
20. Petitioners rely on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1986), and Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), to support the proposition that “where the government articulates
and pursues a legitimate interest for a suspicionless stop, courts should not look behind that
interest to determine whether the government’s ‘primary purpose’ is valid.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at
45.
21. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813).
22. Id. at 46. The Court noted that because the State concedes its primary purpose was to
intercept narcotics, it need not be decided whether a state may establish a checkpoint whose
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The Court concluded that its holding did not affect valid border searches or
those searches conducted at airports and government buildings, where the need
for such measures to ensure public safety was heightened.23 In addition, the
ability of police officers to respond to information properly acquired during a
checkpoint stop, justified by a lawful primary purpose, was not debilitated.24
Finally, the purpose inquiry was to be conducted only at the programmatic
level and was not an invitation to “probe the minds of individual officers acting
at the scene.”25 Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint
was concededly one of general crime control, it violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed.26
This Note will analyze the current state of the law surrounding vehicle
roadblocks and checkpoints due to the recent Supreme Court case, City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond. Part I will provide a summary of the relevant
principles behind the Fourth Amendment where the courts have upheld
seizures at roadblock checkpoints without a warrant or probable cause. Part II
will provide a brief discussion of the circuit split regarding the legality of
vehicle roadblocks and Brown v. Texas, which set forth the three-prong test
governing the reasonableness of seizures. Part III will critically evaluate City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the recent Supreme Court decision discussing
vehicle roadblocks and checkpoints, and suggest its departure from Brown v.
Texas and unprecedented use of a “primary” purpose. Finally, Part IV will
conclude with the overall significance and future impact this case will have on
the current state of law.
I. VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS: A UNIQUE EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A.

Introduction

The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that people have a right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrants permitting
such searches or seizures will be granted absent a showing of probable cause.27
primary purpose is to check for vehicle registration, while its secondary purpose is for general
criminal law enforcement purposes. Id. at 47 n.2.
23. Id. at 47-48.
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id.
26. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures, it follows that government activity must first rise to the level of a “search”
or “seizure” to be subject to the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable criterion. Reasonable
searches and seizures are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. See generally STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY
33 (5th ed. 1986).
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While judicial developments have determined what constitutes a reasonable
search and seizure,28 they have also determined what types of government
activity rise to the level of a search or seizure.29
28. “Search” is commonly defined by the “reasonable expectation” test fashioned in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the District Court for the Southern District of
California convicted petitioner on an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a
federal statute. Id. at 348. While the Katz majority held that the government’s activities
constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it was Justice
Harlan’s concurrence that established the modern test to determine reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. at 360-61. Courts use this two-pronged test to determine whether government
conduct constitutes a search. First, it must be shown that a person exhibits an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation is one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Government conduct does not rise to
the level of a search if either prong is lacking. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 88 (2d ed. 1997). Because Harlan’s subjective prong was severely
criticized, Harlan ultimately concluded that the objective expectation prong should surpass the
subjective expectation, as “[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into [the] rules[,] customs and values of the past and present.”
Id. at 89.
In the landmark case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1959), the Court first defined “seizure”
of a person. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon that was discovered after
Officer McFadden patted down the outside of his clothing, fearing that he might have a gun. Id.
at 6-7. Commonly known as a Terry stop, the Court stated, “whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” Id. at 16.
Moreover, the Court established a two-pronged test for determining the reasonableness of a
seizure: (1) whether the officer’s actions were justified at the time of the event, and (2) whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances, which justified the interference in the first
place. Id. at 19-20. The first prong, which later becomes a relevant focus in roadblock cases,
focuses on governmental interest that justifies such an intrusion upon the private citizen’s
constitutionally protected interests, for there is “no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.” Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967)). In justifying, the officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable” facts which,
combined with rational inferences, reasonably warrant that intrusion—simple good faith is not
enough. Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court further developed the status of
seizures of personal property, considering them unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
without a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. Id. at 701. Here, Place was approached
by law enforcement officers at Miami International Airport, as well as authorities in New York
LaGuardia Airport, after they were aroused by his suspicious behavior. The New York federal
narcotics agents asked to search his luggage, to which he refused, and they notified him they
would take the luggage to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant. Place’s bags were
eventually taken to Kennedy Airport where they were subjected to a “sniff test” by a trained
narcotics detention dog. The dog alerted to the smaller of the two bags where the agents
discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine. Place was eventually indicted for possession of cocaine with
the intent to distribute, to which he replied that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
warrantless seizure of his luggage. Applying Terry, the Eastern District of New York stated that
seizure of the luggage could only be justified if it was based on reasonable suspicion to believe
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The actual text of the Fourth Amendment can be divided into two general
parts: the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause, respectively. The first
depicts what the amendment seeks to prohibit, or what rights citizens hold
against the government, and the second states what is required before a warrant
may be properly issued.30 Probable cause, found within the warrant clause, is
defined as the “minimum showing necessary to support a warrant
that the bags contained narcotics, and as such existed, Place’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated. Id. at 698-700. The Supreme Court stated that Terry allowed seizures based on
reasonable and articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, and that the exclusion of the
probable cause requirement, or articulable suspicion, was justified by balancing the nature and
quality of the intrusion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental
interests. Id. at 702-03. Place argued that a general interest in law enforcement (versus a special
interest) cannot justify an intrusion on one’s Fourth Amendment right. Id. at 703-04. He also
argued that the Terry stop is inapplicable to the investigative detentions of property because the
exclusion is premised on the underlying principle that such a stop is less intrusive to a person’s
liberty than a formal arrest, and as to property, there are no degrees of intrusion; therefore once
the property is seized, dispossession is absolute. Id. at 705. To this the Court responded that
detentions of property can also vary in their intrusiveness, as such seizures may come after a
person has “relinquished control of the property to a third party” or “police may [simply] confine
their investigation to an on-the-spot inquiry.” Id. at 705-06. The Court ultimately held that the
principles of Terry applied to allow an officer, who reasonably believes a traveler to be
transporting narcotics, to detain the luggage and briefly investigate the circumstances that arouse
his suspicion, provided the investigation is properly limited in scope. Id. at 706.
Finally, the Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), added one more
prong to the seizure definition. A person has been “seized” if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to
leave. Id. at 554. Here, when federal drug agents approached the defendant in an airport,
identified themselves, and asked to see her identification and ticket, she handed it to the officers.
Id. at 547-48. The Court held that such actions of the agents did not constitute a seizure because
nothing suggested that the defendant had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to
walk away. Id. at 555.
[This conclusion] is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by
the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the
voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having been so informed. We
also reject the argument that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that the
respondent acted in a manner contrary to her self-interest is that she was compelled to
answer the agents’ questions. It may happen that a person makes statements to law
enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the
statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily.
Id. at 555-56 (citation omitted).
29. Implicating the principles laid out in Katz, namely that the Fourth Amendment protects
people from unreasonable intrusions into their legitimate privacy expectations, and further having
affirmed that a person does in fact possess a privacy interest in their personalty, one of the
signature propositions to emerge from Place, which becomes relevant in the principle case, is that
information obtained through a dog sniff is less intrusive than a typical search, and a “sniff” does
not rise to the level of a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
The Court acknowledged that the agents did in fact “seize” Place’s luggage. Id.
30. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 69.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

182

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:175

application,”31 the substance of which is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt.32 Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge, relying on reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient to make a man of reasonable caution believe that an offense has been
or is being committed.33 Essentially, it is the threshold proof requirement of
the Fourth Amendment—the higher it is set, the greater the role becomes for
the judge in sustaining warrants and protecting the public against police
searches and seizures.34
The most fundamental principle remains that only those search and
seizures that are unreasonable are prohibited. Searches and seizures are
presumed to be unreasonable unless carried out pursuant to a warrant, and such
a warrant must be based upon probable cause.35 However, the Supreme Court,
in a variety of circumstances, has carved out instances where a search or
seizure may fall within a special needs category beyond what is normal for law
enforcement, making either or both the warrant and probable cause
requirements impracticable.36 These exclusions relate primarily to the areas of:
(1) administrative searches,37 (2) searches of individuals pursuant to “special
31. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 33.
32. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (citing McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99
Pa. 63, 69 (1881)).
33. Id. at 175-76 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
34. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 73. For further information concerning
probable cause, see generally DRESSLER, supra note 28, ch. 9. See also Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), which marked the beginning of
“probable cause” gaining judicial attention. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 73.
35. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 33.
36. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 279 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
37. These judicially fashioned exclusions began with Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959), and the companion cases Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), where the Court took its first step away from the traditional
notion of “probable cause” and replaced it with a “reasonableness” standard. DRESSLER, supra
note 28, at 280-81. The facts mirror each other in all three cases. Plaintiffs—a homeowner in
Frank, lessee of a ground floor apartment in Camara, and a warehouse owner in See—refused to
permit a city inspection of their premises without a search warrant and argued that such a
warrantless inspection violated their Fourth Amendment rights. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 525-26;
See, 387 U.S. at 541-42; Frank, 359 U.S. at 361. Even though the result was the same, the
rationale of Camara and See (decided the same day) essentially overruled that of Frank. The
Frank Court has been interpreted as carving out an administrative exclusion to the traditional rule
that warrantless searches are unreasonable. Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
[M]unicipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs ‘touch at most upon the
periphery of the important interest safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection against official intrusion’ because the inspections are merely to determine
whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards
prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector does not ask that the
property owner open his doors to a search for ‘evidence of criminal action’ which may be
used to secure the owner’s criminal conviction, historic interests of ‘self-protection’
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needs”38 and (3) roadblocks or vehicle checkpoints.39 The first two exclusions,
as evidenced by their names, relate to searches and focus on the primary
jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are said not to be involved, but
only the less intense ‘right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy.’
Id. at 530 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Camara and See agree that routine inspections of
a physical condition are less intrusive; nevertheless they depart company with Frank which
asserts that such Fourth Amendment interests are merely peripheral. Id.; See, 387 U.S. at 542
(“find[ing] the principles enunciated in the Camara opinion applicable [in See]”). As searches
pursuant to criminal investigations have as their base specific items they may be trying to recover,
civil inspection programs are aimed at securing a citywide compliance with a particular provision.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 535. The normative standard in the former is that there is “probable cause”
to issue a warrant, but in the latter, the Court reasoned that the particular inspection must simply
be “reasonable.” Id.
There is a unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal
codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures. It is here that the probable cause
debate is focused, for the agency’s decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on
its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each
particular building. Id. at 535-36. Essentially, Camara and See developed an administrative
search version of “probable cause” that does not require the type of individualized suspicion that
plays a role in probable cause. Except in the event of an emergency, such a search must be
“reasonable,” a term defined by balancing the “need to search against the invasion with the search
entails.” Id. at 537; DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 281. This same balancing test was used one
year later in Terry. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Since See, a three-part test has developed which spoke to the warrantless and nonexigent search of a “closely regulated” business. In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987),
the Court held that (1) the regulatory scheme must advance a substantial government interest, (2)
the inspection must be necessary to further that scheme, and (3) the statute’s inspection program
must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, advising the owner of the
commercial premise that the search is being made pursuant to law with a properly defined scope
and limiting the discretion of the inspecting officers. Id. at 702-03.
38. Where the “administrative” cases involved “essentially limited, nonpersonal
investigations, the ‘special needs’ cases are full-fledged searches aimed at discerning evidence of
individual wrongdoing.” Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, “Special Needs” And The Fourth Amendment: An
Exception Poised To Swallow The Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529,
536 (1997). This category generally includes searches of students and employees in the absence
of a warrant and probable cause. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S 325 (1985), the Court applied
the reasonableness balancing test and ruled that public school teachers and administrators may
search students provided that: (1) there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
would turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating the law or school rules, and
(2) the measures adopted in the search reasonably relate to the objective of the search, and are
“not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.” Id. at 341. Here, two female students were caught smoking in the bathroom in
violation of school rules. The students were brought before the vice-principal. When the
defendant denied that she had been smoking, the administrator demanded her purse, opened it,
and observed a package of cigarettes. He removed the cigarettes, and in doing so discovered
cigarette paper, which is often used to make marijuana cigarettes. Based on that observation, he
conducted a full search of the defendant’s purse, during which he found other evidence that
implicated her in the sale of marijuana. The evidence was handed over to the police and used in a

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

184

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:175

purpose. However, in the final exclusion, characterized primarily as a
“seizure,” the pressing difficulty is whether the same purpose inquiry is
equally relevant. As discussed below in the Edmond dissent, the emphasis on

juvenile court proceeding against her. Id. at 328-29. The Court determined that the normal
warrant and probable cause requirements would frustrate “the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures” necessary in schools, and the standard that would govern the legality of this search
would be one based on reasonableness, “spar[ing] teachers and school administrators the
necessity of schooling themselves in the necessities of probable cause and permit them to regulate
conduct according to reason and common sense.” Id. at 340, 343; Buffaloe, supra, at 536. The
“special need” language is found in Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, where he echoes the
sentiment of the Court:
The Court correctly states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probablecause requirement ‘[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggest that the public interest is best served’ by a lesser standard. [W]e have used such a
balancing test . . . only when we were confronted with ‘a special law enforcement need
for greater flexibility.’
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
The Court went on to state:
Education ‘is perhaps the most important function’ of government, and government has a
heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school. The
special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of
schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in
applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests.
Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
The Court did away with the notion of individualized suspicion in two companion cases,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and National Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), as well as in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Skinner and Von Raab concerned mandatory urinalyses test for
employees, based on a triggering event—a train accident in Skinner and application for
employment in Von Raab. In justifying its departure from warrants and probable cause, the Court
said there was a “special need in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety,”
and a special governmental need to dissuade those persons eligible for sensitive positions from
drugs. Buffaloe, supra, at 539-40. Yet, in Acton, there is an even further departure from
individualized suspicion. In desperation of curbing a disciplinary problem in its student athletes,
the School District instituted a policy of random drug testing, the authorization form for which
the defendant’s parents refused to sign, consequently banning him from the school football team.
Acton, 515 U.S. at 650-51. The Court considered “the decreased expectation of privacy [of
student athletes], the relative unobtrusiveness of the search and the severity of the need met,” and
upheld this suspicionless random urinalyses test as reasonable and therefore constitutional. Id. at
664-65. For an in-depth discussion on the “special needs” exception, see generally Buffaloe,
supra (arguing that this exception is so broad and far-reaching that it turns the warrant
requirement on its head) and Loree L. French, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n and
the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause Requirement: Special Needs Exception
Creating a Shakedown Inspection, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 126-39 (1990).
39. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 280-300; SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 299; 4
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6, at
307 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Treatise I].
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“purpose” in the search analysis is due to the traditional notions of privacy one
can expect to have in their own home; whereas, this same notion of privacy
expectation is not usually present in the seizure analysis of one’s automobile
on a public highway.
B.

Vehicle Checkpoints: Uncertain Reliance on “Purpose”

The most relevant exception with which this Note is concerned is the
vehicle checkpoint, also known as a roadblock stop. Law enforcement
personnel utilize vehicle checkpoints as a primary means of enforcing vehicle
regulations on the highway. Checkpoints have been maintained to verify
driver’s license and registration, inspect vehicles in accordance with safety
standards, check driver sobriety, weigh and check truck cargo and identify
those vehicles transporting illegal aliens.40 A common thread woven into each
of these vehicle stops is that they are “suspicionless.” In other words, the very
establishment of the checkpoint program is to prevent or check the mere
possibility that one may be drunk, have an expired or invalid driver’s license or
registration, or be attempting to smuggle aliens across the border. The notion
of probable cause or individualized suspicion, therefore, is immaterial; rather
the essence of the stop is one of a legitimate public interest.41
1.

Supreme Court Roadblock Case #1: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

The first of two leading Supreme Court cases to discuss seizures pursuant
to roadblocks is United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, in which several
respondents, including Martinez-Fuerte, were charged with counts of illegally
transporting Mexican aliens across the border.42 Each respondent brought
motions to suppress the evidence on the ground that the operation of the
checkpoint was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.43 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of California denied Martinez-Fuerte’s
motion to suppress, but granted similar motions in two other cases.44
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the Government appealed the
granting of the motions in the other respective cases.45 The Ninth Circuit
consolidated all three appeals, and ultimately reversed Martinez-Fuerte’s
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the other cases.46 The Court,
40. See Treatise I, supra note 39, at 307. See also discussion infra Part B.
41. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562.
42. Id. at 547-49 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 893 (1975)) (concerning a
checkpoint located on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, California, 66 miles north of the Mexican
border).
43. Id. at 548.
44. Id. at 549. The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different District Judge than
in the other cases. Id. at 549 n.4.
45. Id. at 549.
46. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 549.
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in a 7-2 decision, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which had affirmed the conviction of one respondent, and reversed and
remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with
directions to affirm the conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
cases to the District Court for further proceedings.47
The Court began its analysis in Martinez-Fuerte by recognizing the
national policy of the United States to limit the influx of immigration by way
of permanent, temporary and roving checkpoints set up by the Border Patrol.48
It is established that checkpoint stops are “seizures” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, yet respondents argued that such routine vehicle stops
were invalid in the absence of reasonable suspicion and, in the alternative, that
“routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the
advance judicial authorization of a warrant.”49
In viewing the substance of the analysis to rest upon balancing the interests
at stake, the Court concluded that routine stops do not intrude upon one’s
privacy in the same manner as the inspection of one’s home would,50 because
the stops involve only a brief detention, and an appreciably less-likely creation
of fear or concern.51 Moreover, it added that a prerequisite of reasonable
suspicion to vehicle stops would be impracticable given that the heavy flow of
traffic would make it virtually impossible to allow for the “particularized study
of any given car as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.”52 The Court then
prevented any further “individualized suspicion” advances, asserting:
[T]he Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion [as] is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court . . . [where] the Court
examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intrusions
“upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen” and
concluded that under the circumstances the government interests outweighed
those of the private citizen.53

47. Id. at 567.
48. Id. at 551-53.
Permanent checkpoints . . . are maintained at or near intersections of important roads
leading away from the border. They operate on a coordinate basis designed to avoid
circumvention by smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally are established in other
strategic locations. Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the checkpoint
system.
Id. at 552 (footnote omitted). The Court focused on the permanent checkpoint in this case. Id. at
553.
49. Id. at 556.
50. See discussion supra note 37 concerning the inspection of one’s home.
51. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-58.
52. Id. at 557.
53. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
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The Court found it was justified in applying the Camara conclusion
because it was dealing neither with “searches nor with the sanctity of private
dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection.”54 However, it also concluded that such a model was not on all
fours with Martinez-Fuerte because the strong interests that justify a warrant
were not present in this case.55 Specifically, the intrusion into one’s private
dwelling justified the issuing of a warrant in Camara because the occupant had
no way of knowing whether inspection of his premises was necessary to
enforce the municipal code, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector’s power to search and no way of knowing whether the inspector
On the other hand, the visible
himself was properly authorized.56
manifestations of the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte provide motorists with
substantially the same assurances as the warrants in Camara.57
The Court ultimately held that stops for brief questioning routinely
conducted at permanent checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment
and did not require a warrant.58 Moreover, as checkpoint searches are
constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause, the Court limited
Martinez-Fuerte to “the type of stops described in this opinion [and stated that]
[a]ny further detention must be based on consent or probable cause.”59
Between Martinez-Fuerte and the second leading roadblock case, the
Court decided two fundamental cases, Delaware v. Prouse60 and Brown v.
Texas.61 The Court suggested the possibility of another legitimate roadblock in
Prouse, and in Brown, it set forth a three-part balancing test to determine the
reasonableness of seizures.62
In Prouse, a police officer observed marijuana in plain view in the
defendant’s car during a routine stop to check for a valid driver’s license and
vehicle registration.63 While it was agreed that states have a vital interest in
ensuring that only qualified drivers are permitted on the road, the Court
suppressed the narcotics because it was not convinced that the officer’s actions
were necessary given the alternative mechanisms available to further the
legitimate interest.64 The Court further found it troubling that no empirical
54. Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 564-65.
56. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 532).
57. Id. at 565; Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
58. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566.
59. Id. at 566-67.
60. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
61. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
62. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.
63. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650-51.
64. Id. at 659-60. Outside the traditional observation of traffic violations, Delaware also
required that vehicles carry and display current license plates, evidence of proper registration,
pass an annual safety inspection and be properly insured. Id. at 660.
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data existed to override the assumption that the “contribution to highway safety
made by discretionary stops selected from among drivers generally [would] be
marginal at best.”65 The Court concluded that stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of
the automobile were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, outside of
having at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered.66 Nonetheless, this did not
bar Delaware or any other State from “developing methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of
discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one
possible alternative.”67
In Brown, the Court introduced what later became the “Brown Balancing
Test.” Here two police officers on patrol observed the appellant and another
man walking in opposite directions in an alley that was known for high drug
activity.68 Believing that the two men had previously been together, the
officers stopped the appellant and asked for his identification because he
“looked suspicious” and the officer had not previously seen him in the area.69
The appellant refused the request, and the officer arrested him pursuant to a
Texas statute which criminalizes a person’s “refuse[al] to give his name and
address to an officer ‘who has lawfully stopped him and requested the
information.’”70 After the Court held that enforcement of the statute violated
the appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights, Justice Burger set forth a threepronged test to determine when a brief detention of a person is reasonable.71
He stated that the constitutionality of a seizure depends upon “weighing . . . the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.”72 Further, this seizure “must be based on specific,
objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interest requires the seizure
of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a
plan embodying the explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual
officers.”73

65. Id. at 660. The Court added that such a marginal contribution to roadway safety does not
justify subjecting every vehicle to a roadside seizure. Id. at 661.
66. Id. at 663.
67. Id.
68. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1979).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 50-51.
72. Id. at 51.
73. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).
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Supreme Court Roadblock Case #2: Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sitz

The second leading Supreme Court roadblock case is Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz.74 In Sitz, the Court distinguished a previous
line of cases75 and upheld the use of a sobriety checkpoint without the presence
of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.76 Also known as DWI (Driving
While Intoxicated) roadblocks,77 the site of these temporary checkpoints78 are
usually determined by administrative officers based upon empirical data
indicating that drunk drivers in a particular locale pose a safety problem to
law-abiding drivers.79 Additionally, “[l]aw enforcement officials usually do
not attempt to secure prior judicial approval for either the location of the
roadblock or the conduct of the stops.”80 Prior to Sitz, many states, though not
all, were striking down these sobriety roadblocks on constitutional grounds,
finding injustice in allowing police to stop motorists for evidence of
intoxication without individualized suspicion.81
The Court asserted that the lower court, which previously ruled that this
method was unconstitutional, erroneously analyzed the three-prong test from
Brown to determine whether the brief detention of a person is reasonable.82
Both courts found that the first prong was legitimately satisfied because drunk
driving was recognized as a substantial state interest in Prouse,83 but found the
third prong to be significant. Although the objective intrusion (a twenty-five
second delay) was minimal, the subjective intrusion was substantial because it
had the potential to generate fear and surprise in “approaching motorists [who
might not] be aware of their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the

74. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
75. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Prouse, 440 U.S. 648;
Brown, 443 U.S. 47. In Brignoni-Ponce, roving border patrol agents were not justified to stop a
vehicle solely on the ground that its passengers appeared to be of Mexican ancestry. The Court
held that roving agents may not detain a person in a vehicle even briefly for questioning in the
absence of reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the country. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
876, 885-87. See also DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 284. For a discussion of Prouse and Brown,
see supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
76. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444.
77. Treatise I, supra note 39, at 687.
78. See supra note 48 (distinguishing permanent, temporary and roving checkpoints).
79. Treatise I, supra note 39, at 688.
80. Id.
81. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 286-87. For further discussion of those cases that upheld
DWI roadblocks, see Treatise I, supra note 39, at 689 n.95. See also id. for those cases striking
down DWI roadblocks.
82. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 445 (1990).
83. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 658-62 (1979); Treatise I, supra note 39, at 690.
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checkpoints.”84 The Supreme Court, instead of comparing the intrusion to
roving border patrols as the lower courts did, compared it to a fixed, brief stop
at a checkpoint for illegal aliens, stating that the intrusion on motorists’
security was slight.85 As to the second prong, the lower court also said this
was not met because the program did not sufficiently advance public interest.
The Court held that the lower court’s reliance on the second prong to evaluate
the “effectiveness” of the program was misplaced in that the passage was “not
meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the
decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques
should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.”86
The Court went on to distinguish Prouse, which also weighed the degree to
which the seizures advanced public interest of highway safety, commenting
that Prouse was totally void of any empirical data to support the advancement
of such seizures.87 However, in Sitz the state provided actual statistics of the
program’s effectiveness and further produced an expert witness to testify that
sobriety checkpoints produced around a one percent arrest rate.88 It concluded
that the balancing of the state’s interest in preventing drunk driving and the
degree of intrusion upon the individual motorists who were stopped tipped the
scales in favor of the state program, and it was therefore consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.89
Finally, Whren v. United States served to limit the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable seizures to an “objective” analysis.90
Patrolling what was known as a high drug area of the District of Columbia,
officers, in plainclothes and an unmarked car, pulled over a vehicle because of
its suspicious behavior.91 The officers observed the vehicle’s “youthful
84. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452. The lower court evinced this notion of generating fear and surprise
from a similar condemnation of actions of the roving patrols in Brignoni-Ponce. DRESSLER,
supra note 28, at 288.
85. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543, 558
(1976)).
86. Id. at 453.
87. Id. at 454-55. Approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers that passed through the
checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. Id. at 455. An expert further testified that
“experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in
drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped.” Id. The Court concluded
that “this ‘record . . . provide[d] a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the checkpoint’
and we sustained its constitutionality.” Id.
88. Id.
89. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. On remand from the Supreme Court, however, the Michigan
Supreme Court reinstated its original decision that the roadblock was unconstitutional, reasoning
that seizures within the primary goal of enforcing the criminal law have generally required some
essence of reasonable suspicion. See Sitz v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 22425 (Mich. 1993).
90. 517 U.S. 806 (1986).
91. Id. at 808-09.
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occupants waiting at a stop sign [and] the driver looking down into the lap of
the passenger at his right. [Having] remained stopped at the intersection for
what seemed an unusually long time—more than twenty seconds—the
[vehicle] turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an
‘unreasonable’ speed.”92 Upon pulling the vehicle over and moving towards it,
one officer immediately observed two bags in the petitioner’s hands, which
appeared to contain crack cocaine, arrested the occupants and retrieved the
narcotics.93
Accepting the argument that the officers had probable cause to believe that
a traffic violation had occurred, the petitioners argued that, in the realm of civil
traffic violations, mere probable cause was not enough.94 They asserted that
because total compliance with traffic codes is virtually impossible, it just
opened the door for any officer “to catch any given motorist in a technical
violation [thus] creat[ing] the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of
investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even
articulable suspicion exists.”95
Consequently, the petitioners asserted that the traditional Fourth
Amendment test for traffic stops, based on probable cause, should be replaced
by a more subjective test asking “whether a police officer, acting reasonably,
would have made the stop for the reason given,” essentially preventing any
type of pretextual stop. 96
The Court, while agreeing that the Constitution prevented any sort of
“selective enforcement of the law,” reminded the petitioners that the
appropriate grounds for such an argument is the Equal Protection Clause and
not the Fourth Amendment because “subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”97 The underlying basis

92. Id. at 808.
93. Id. at 808-09.
94. Id. at 810. See also D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 18, § 2213.4 (1995) (District of Columbia
traffic code) (“An operator shall . . . give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle.”);
§ 2204.3 (“No person shall turn any vehicle . . . without giving an appropriate signal.”); § 2200.3
(“No person shall drive a vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
conditions.”).
95. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. The petitioners, who were black, argued that such a loose
probable cause standard allowed officers to stop motorists on the basis of “decidedly
impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s occupants.” Id.
96. Id. For petitioner’s cases supporting their position that the Court had disapproved
pretextual stops, see id. at 811-12. The Court responded to the petitioner’s cases by stating that
they had never held, outside the context of inventory and administrative searches, that “an
officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but
[had] repeatedly held [to] the contrary.” Id. at 812-13.
97. Id. at 813. The Court seemed to probe into the petitioner’s proposed subjective test and
found it nothing more than a roundabout way to “combat . . . the perceived ‘danger’ of the
pretextual stop.” Id. at 814. The proposed test’s “whole purpose is to prevent the police from
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for the gamut of Fourth Amendment cases is not to establish the subjective
intent of individual officers—for then the petitioners’ argument of revealing
subjective intent through objective means may work—but rather the principle
basis is to allow certain actions to be taken under certain circumstances,
regardless of subjective intent.98 Finally, the Court added that to apply the
petitioners’ test would result in great difficulty because the actions of the
“reasonable officer” vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the protection of
the Fourth Amendment should not be so inconsistent.99
The Court concluded by noting that because the officers had probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation had been committed, that rendered the
stop reasonable per the Fourth Amendment and the evidence seized was
therefore admissible.100
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE LEGALITY OF PRETEXTUAL ROADBLOCKS—A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BROWN V. TEXAS
The majority in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, discussed below in Part
III, placed notable emphasis on the primary purpose. The dissent, however,
maintained that the Brown Balancing Test should guide the Court. While the
Supreme Court’s decision is the controlling law, the circuit courts split on this
issue, prior to Edmond, provided a relevant understanding into the perspectives
of both the majority and the dissent.
Courts have generally used Brown’s three-pronged test101 to determine the
reasonableness of seizures, observing that such reasonableness must strike a
“balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal
security free from arbitrary inferences by law officers.”102 The question being
when, if at all, the pretext of general law enforcement can be the basis for law
officers seizing evidence of more serious crimes. The only relevant Supreme
Court roadblock case that has applied Brown is Sitz; however, Brown itself
relied on both Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse in defining its scope.
Brown noted that protecting individuals from the “unfettered discretion of
officers,” is a central concern that is best met by requiring that a seizure be
based on specific, objective facts indicating “society’s legitimate interest [in]
the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure [is] carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers,” which is extracted both from Prouse and Martinez-

doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different
reasons.” Id.
98. Id. at 814.
99. Id. at 815.
100. Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
101. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
102. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
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Fuerte.103 Finally, Sitz prompts that in considering the severity of the intrusion
on individual liberty, the court must look both at the objective nature of the
intrusion (duration of the stop and intensity of the inquiry) and its subjective
intrusion (the potential to generate fear and surprise to law-abiding
motorists).104
Of greater merit, as evidenced by the majority opinion in Edmond, is the
stated or underlying “purpose” for the checkpoint program. Yet, as the dissent
points out in Goldsmith II, the plain language of the Fourth Amendment does
not lend itself to such an inquiry.105 In looking for the starting place for this
contention, the search ended at United States v. McFayden.106 In McFayden,
narcotics were discovered in the defendant’s automobile after it was stopped at
a police traffic roadblock.107 The court found that the roadblock passed
constitutional muster because it was “established to respond to identified
problems of traffic congestion; it was designed to improve traffic enforcement
in neighborhoods experiencing serious problems; [and] its principal purpose
was to allow police to check for a driver’s license and vehicle registration
[advancing] the legitimate governmental interests it was designed to serve.”108
In the assessment of the legality of the roadblock, McFayden stated there was
one additional factor that must be considered—whether “a roadblock
purportedly established to check licenses could be located and conducted in
such a way as to indicate that its principal purpose was the detection of crimes
unrelated to licensing.”109 The Court went on to say that since the purpose of
the roadblock, to check drivers’ licenses and car registrations, was legitimate,
then officers were not required to close their eyes if in the process of their
legitimate activities they found evidence of other crimes.110
The cases finding these checkpoints “illegal”111 balanced the public
interest and the right of the individual analysis by way of determining the
primary purpose of the program, to satisfy the first factor of the Brown test.
One court found the primary purpose to be related to “Operation Clean Sweep,
103. Id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55, 663 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-62 (1976)).
104. United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 552 (1998) (citing Mich. Dep’t of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)).
105. See Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1999).
106. 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
107. Id. at 1307.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 1312 (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(a), at 63-64 (2d ed. 1987)) [hereinafter Treatise II].
110. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1985); Treatise II, supra
note 109, at 64 n.58).
111. Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. MoralesZamora, 974 F.2d 149 (1992); United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 552 (1998); Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 540 (1999); Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999).
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violence, drugs and guns” and less related to traffic problems.112 Another
court found the primary purpose was to detect narcotics, despite the alleged
purpose of detecting drunk drivers, commenting that “[the state’s] actions
[spoke] louder than [its] words.”113 Still another court had a very easy task in
determining the primary purpose where the chief of police “admitted that the
‘primary goal,’ or ‘underlying purpose,’ of the roadblocks was to ‘look for
drugs,’” even though he asserted that another reason was to check drivers’
licenses, vehicle registrations and proof of insurance.114 The Seventh Circuit
in Goldsmith II also found that the primary purpose of the Indianapolis
checkpoint, as conceded, was to catch drug offenders, aside from the fact that
the police often discovered violations of traffic laws.115
In sum, those courts finding that the primary purpose of the programs was
to further general law enforcement purposes, as in the above cases, also found
that individual suspicion must exist before a suspect could be seized or else the
Fourth Amendment was violated.116 Where law enforcement established a
checkpoint for a lawful purpose and performed an unlawful search for
contraband during the stop, such a roadblock was pretextual, and any evidence
obtained was tainted.117 Moreover, some courts expressly disagreed with the
“mixed-motive” checkpoint theory, which held that the entire checkpoint was
legitimate so long as one of the underlying purposes, no matter how minor,
was lawful.118 No Court of Appeals has agreed with the “mixed-motive”
analysis, but rather has upheld roadblocks only if the primary purpose was
lawful.119
These same cases relied a great deal on statistical and empirical data in
determining the second factor of Brown, the degree to which the seizure
advanced the public interest. Similar to the Court distinguishing Prouse from
Sitz based on the lack of empirical data in Prouse,120 the “illegal” cases
computed a percentage based on the approximate number of cars stopped at the
checkpoint, and the number of arrests made in relation to the focus of the
program, and gauged that percentage as a level of effectiveness of the
112. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 997.
113. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 555.
114. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d at 150.
115. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 665.
116. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 998-99, 1001; Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 563 (citing Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
117. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d at 152-53. “‘[T]here is nothing new in the realization that
the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us
all.’ Like the rains from heaven, constitutional rights fall on the just and the unjust.” Id. at 153
(quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987)).
118. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 553-54. This case refers to Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th
Cir. 1995), discussed infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
119. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 554.
120. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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checkpoint, often citing to the 1.6 percent approved in Sitz.121 In sum, if the
government failed to produce enough or sufficient evidence to show that the
very nature of its program advanced the public interest, the program was less
likely to be upheld.
Finally, the objective-subjective intrusion plays into Brown’s third factor—
how severe the interference is with individual liberty. Here, the courts
generally had little problem with the objective intrusion, as most of the stops
were lasting no more than ten to fifteen seconds, up to two to three minutes.122
Yet, the main concern seemed to come with the subjective intrusion—probing
the elements of “fear and surprise” in the motorist. Such an intrusion was high
where the motorists felt
that they [were] being singled out by random, roving-patrol stops, which
frequently [took] place on seldom-traveled roads. The fear and surprise [was]
decreased if the stops [were] operated in a regularized manner, and if they
“appear[ed] to and actually involve[d] less discretionary enforcement activity.”
When the motorist could “see that other vehicles [were] being stopped [and
could] see visible signs of the officer’s authority he [would be] much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”123

The courts, in some of these cases, found the subjective intrusion to be
substantial where: the roadblock was set up as a trap, tricking the motorist into
thinking that the checkpoint was one-half or another mile down the road, but
was actually located at the bottom of an exit ramp, where few people normally
exit;124 there were no barriers, signs, traffic cones or other visible means of
alerting motorist that they are approaching a checkpoint;125 and there were no
121. See, e.g., Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 559 (0.29% level of effectiveness); Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1999) (stating that the Commonwealth needed to present
some evidence establishing that “the method employed will be an effective tool for addressing the
public concern involved” where security checkpoints were set up at the Hoffler Apartment
Complex in response to resident complaints about trespassers and drug dealers on the premises);
Galberth, 590 A.2d at 999. There was no empirical data that the roadblock technique effectively
promoted the government’s interest, as the Court found it was “common sense” that in an area
that suddenly becomes “saturated” with police would effectively disrupt normal activity. Id.;
Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661-62 (mentioning briefly that the “hit rate” for Indianapolis’ program
is 9%, but seeming to dismiss this fact, vying that court’s do not usually address reasonableness at
the program level where general criminal law enforcement is the basis for the search.).
122. Cf. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 560 (noting that the detention lasted several minutes which,
while not objectively long, was still a great deal longer than those detentions that were less than
thirty seconds and upheld in Sitz) with Galberth, 590 A.2d at 992. The detention lasted for
approximately two to three minutes, but the court did not comment on whether or not that was
unusually long. Id. See also Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (typical
stop lasts two to three minutes).
123. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 560-61 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 561. The exit ramp was located in a secluded area, and there was no notice to the
motorist regarding what was about to take place. Id.
125. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 992; Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 561.
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procedural guidelines established in how to approach the car.126 The holdings,
in sum, were concerned with the primary purpose of the roadblock, finding
them to either be one of general law enforcement or pretextual for the same
and therefore unconstitutional.
Under Brown, those cases finding the roadblocks to be “legal,” including
the District Court in Goldsmith I,127 did not focus on the primary purpose of
the checkpoints, but rather found merit in a dual-purpose. They further
determined the objective and subjective intrusions to be minimal, ultimately
upholding the states’ actions. The first factor, the state’s interests, was easily
satisfied. Even though the “primary” purpose of these checkpoints was to
interdict drugs, these courts have adopted a mixed-motive approach,128
allowing states to prohibit the flow of narcotics,129 where a license check,
registration check or the like was also conducted.130
As to the second factor, the effectiveness of the program in promoting the
state’s interest, the courts again either found this was easily met, to the extent
that the percentage rate was higher than the accepted 1.6% rate in Sitz, and
0.5% accepted in Martinez-Fuerte,131 or instead determined that a program was

126. Cf. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 561 (officer “just happened to be there when [defendants]
came up”) with Galberth, 590 A.2d at 992 (Field Operations Bureau developed manual
containing guidelines for each technique).
127. Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo.
1996); Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016.
128. The Damask court noted that neither it nor the Supreme Court had addressed the specific
question of a drug interdiction program being allowed to serve as the primary purpose for a
checkpoint, but cited to cases that upheld a “dual-purpose” checkpoint. 936 S.W.2d at 572. The
Merrett court stated that where a state has one lawful, justifiable purpose in establishing the
roadblock, such as checking driver’s license and vehicle registration, the additional purpose of
controlling the flow of narcotics does not “render the roadblock unconstitutional.” 58 F.3d at
1550-51. See also State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 701 (N.D. 1991) (holding that the safety
inspection served as a legitimate state interest, even though the primary interest was to prohibit
the flow of drugs).
129. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (noting the government’s interest in interdicting
narcotics is beyond serious dispute); Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571 (“Drug trafficking has created a
‘veritable national crisis in law enforcement’ and is ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the
health and welfare of our population.’”) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 668 (1989); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
130. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551. The program advanced a sufficient state interest where it
was to ensure compliance with the state driver’s license and vehicle registration laws. Id. (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657-58 (1979)).
131. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (mentioning that the programs vehicle citation rate of 4.6%
effectively advanced the state’s interest); Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23. The
checkpoints resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests out of 1,161 vehicles stopped, a ratio of
4.7%. Id.
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“effective” even if the checkpoint was at least a reasonably effective tool in
advancing the state’s interest, versus being the most effective means.132
Concerning the final Brown factor, the level of intrusion, both subjective
and objective, was found to be minimal, differing from the above cases where
only the objective intrusion was found to be minimal. In accord with the above
cases, the objective intrusion was minimal where the stops were short in
duration,133 but contrary to the above, the subjective intrusion was also found
to be minimal. The critical factors were whether the checkpoint adequately
informed oncoming motorists of the stop, and whether the checkpoint was
operated in such a way as to minimize officers’ boundless discretion in both
their questioning and stopping of vehicles.134 The courts generally found that
because specific plans and guidelines existed both prior to the actual
checkpoint and during its on-scene operation, such as directing officers as to
the amount and placement of signs, the number of officers to approach the

132. See Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 572 (commenting that whether a checkpoint is the most
effective means of achieving the state’s interest is not dispositive. “The courts need only decide
whether, balanced with the importance of the governmental interest and the degree of intrusion,
checkpoints are at least reasonably effective as a tool in advancing the government’s interest.”);
Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (noting that the choice among reasonable alternatives to
achieve a particular state interest remains with “the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of [the] limited public resources.”); see also State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 633
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]here is no necessity of numbers to establish the constitutional validity
of such operations.”).
133. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (commenting that the typical stop lasted two to
three minutes); Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574 (finding vehicles, on average, were stopped for no
more than two minutes); Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (holding nothing in the record indicated that
any motorist was detained longer than reasonably necessary to check the driver’s license and
registration).
134. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (citing the critical factors as being first “whether
it is set up in a manner which informs incoming motorists that this is an official stop and,
secondly, whether it gives the officers conducting the stop unbridled discretion to randomly target
individual motorists.”) (citing United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1995));
Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574. The critical factor is first whether the checkpoint is “planned and
operated” in such a way that officer discretion is minimized. Questions are asked concerning the
prior planning and outside input, specific guidelines, adequate dissemination to field personnel,
outside supervision, non-arbitrary reasons for choosing the checkpoint, and non-discretionary
criteria in stopping vehicles, and second, the extent to which the stop might generate fear or
concern on the part of the motorist. Id.; see also Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551-52. Because the state
planner anticipated a possible delay for motorists, they instructed officers to wave cars through at
the sign of congestion. However, the officers on the scene did not adequately adhere to such
instructions, and the court determined that this inquiry depends on “whether [the drivers]
reasonably believed they were not free to turn around and to avoid the checkpoint. The clock . . .
begins to run when a reasonable person would believe he cannot leave the line and avoid the
checkpoint.” Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
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vehicles and the type of questions to be asked, the subjective intrusion was
minimal.135
III. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND: PRIMARY OR NOT PRIMARY—WHAT IS
THE PURPOSE?
A.

Majority: Carving out a “Primary” Purpose Prong in the Fourth
Amendment Analysis of Searches

After stating the general rule that searches and seizures must be reasonable
and stating those narrow situations where the usual rule does not apply,136 the
Court, in a majority opinion led by Justice O’Conner, explained what had
appeared to be the crucial factor in the leading roadblock cases: the primary
purpose.
In Martinez-Fuerte, where two immigration checkpoints were constructed
on major United States highways, 100 miles from the Mexican border, the
Court stated the significant factor in its decision was that the “balance tipped in
favor of the Government’s interests in policing the Nation’s borders.”137 In
Sitz, where a Michigan highway sobriety checkpoint program was established,
the Court also held that
[t]his checkpoint . . . was clearly aimed at reducing the immediate hazard
posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways. [Further], [t]he
gravity of the drunk driving problem and the magnitude of the State’s interest
in getting drunk drivers off the road weighed heavily in [the Court’s]
determination that the program was constitutional.138

Finally, in Prouse, though a spot-check of motorists driver’s licenses and
vehicle registration was invalidated only because the officer’s conduct was
unconstitutional,139 the Court “suggested that ‘[q]uestioning of all oncoming
135. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. Motorists were informed of the dates of the
checkpoint in advance, by virtue of the “massive law enforcement presence” as well as the
coverage by the media. Id. In addition, the Indianapolis Police Department restricted a large
amount of individual officer discretion with an on-scene supervisor, who was also bound by the
official guidelines instituted by the Chief of Police. Id.; Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574-75. The
checkpoint was operated according to plans that existed about five months prior to the actual
checkpoint operation, and the specific guidelines set forth in the plans limited officer discretion as
to the actual operation and set up of the checkpoint. Id.; Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1552 (reasoning that
the reasonableness of the intrusion depends upon whether or not motorist reasonably believe that
they are free to leave, the court comments that outside one recorded motorists that had a long
delay, nothing else in the record indicates that motorists believed that they could not leave the
line). See supra note 134 (concerning a driver’s reasonable belief that they are free to leave).
136. See supra notes 13-17.
137. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000).
138. Id. at 39.
139. The officer’s conduct was described as “standardless and unconstrained discretion.”
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
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traffic at roadblock-type stops’ would be a lawful means of serving the interest
in highway safety.”140
The Court noted that the common thread of “highway safety” ran through
all of the cases, as distinguishable from a general interest in crime control.141
Unlike the above cases, however, the State in the case at bar conceded its
primary purpose for the checkpoint was to intercept illegal narcotics, yet the
Court had never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was
to detect evidence of general criminal wrongdoing.142
The State set forth several arguments that focused on the primary purpose,
similar to those in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, to justify its checkpoint program.
First, it proposed that it had the same ultimate purpose of “arresting those
suspected of committing crimes.”143 Yet the Court quickly dismissed the
argument, commenting that
[i]f we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be
little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost
any conceivable law enforcement purpose. [And ultimately] the Fourth
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine
part of American life.144

Second, the State emphasized the severity of the drug problem, as a whole,
to justify its program. 145 Again, the Court found no merit in this argument.
Recognizing the social harm created by drug trafficking and the burden this
illegal activity has placed upon law enforcement, the Court commented that
similar qualms could be made of many other illegal activities. It further added
that the “gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a
given purpose.”146
Third, the State attempted to analogize its own checkpoint to the “antismuggling” purpose of the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, in which the Court
held the “traffic was too heavy to permit ‘particularized study of a given car
that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.’”147
While the Court asserted that such logic is more apropos and forceful for the
Indianapolis checkpoints, it also found that such logic prevails any time a
vehicle “is employed to conceal contraband or other evidence of a crime,” and

140. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39.
141. Id. at 40.
142. Id. at 40-41.
143. Id. at 41-42; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50 (1976); Mich. Dep’t
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 450 (1990).
144. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 42.
147. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557).
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is therefore not comparable.148 Returning again to the predominate primary
purpose argument, the Court once more pointed out that the primary purpose of
the Indianapolis checkpoint was a general interest in crime control, and the
fundamental requirement of individualized suspicion, save for some
circumstances, should not be suspended in such situations.149
Relying on Whren and Bond, the State next argued that such precedent
precludes an inquiry into the “purpose” aspect of a checkpoint program, yet the
Court found that these cases did not control the present case. 150 The Whren
Court was faced with considering whether a temporary stop of a motorist based
upon probable cause was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, unless a reasonable officer would
have been motivated to stop the car with the purpose of enforcing a traffic
law.151 The Court, agreeing that selective enforcement was unconstitutional,
and finding the proper basis for such an objection to be the Equal Protection
Clause and not the Fourth Amendment, ultimately concluded that subjective
intentions of officers play no role in the Fourth Amendment analysis.152
Therefore, the Edmond Court found that while Whren precluded “subjective
intentions” playing a role in the Fourth Amendment analysis, “Whren [did] not
preclude an inquiry into programmatic purpose[s].”153 In Bond, the Court was
faced with the question of whether an officer violated reasonable expectations
while examining carry-on luggage in the overhead compartment of a bus.154

148. Id. The Court noted that the Indianapolis checkpoint lacked the border context element
that was crucial in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. It also stated that this “connection” to the roadway,
asserted by the petitioner, is very different from the close connection to roadway safety presented
in Sitz and Prouse. Id.
149. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. “While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a
checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose
primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 45. See supra notes 20, 90-100 and accompanying text (discussing Whren and
Bond).
151. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
152. Id. at 813; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45.
153. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. For petitioner’s arguments in
Whren, see supra notes 20-22.
154. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000). The petitioner was a passenger on a
Greyhound bus which Agent Cantu boarded to check for immigrants. Id. Cantu squeezed the
soft luggage passengers had brought on board that was placed in the overhead compartments. Id.
Cantu squeezed petitioner’s bag and felt a “brick-like” object in the bag. Id. at 336. The
petitioner admitted the bag was his and allowed Cantu to open it. Id. Cantu discovered a brick of
methamphetamine, and petitioner was indicted for conspiracy to possess, and possession with
intent to distribute, methamphetamine. Id. The petitioner argued that Cantu conducted an illegal
search of his bag. Id. While he “conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, [he]
contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag in a way that other passengers would not.” Id.
It was undisputed that petitioner had a privacy interest in his bag, but “the Government assert[ed]
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Again applying the principles set forth in Whren, the Bond Court reaffirmed
the standard that subjective intentions of officers are irrelevant to such
analysis.155 The Edmond Court went on to comment that because Bond was
not an “ordinary probable-cause” analysis case, subjective intent was
irrelevant, in that precedent required a focus on the “objective effects of the
actions of an individual officer.”156 By contrast, cases concerning intrusions
that occurred pursuant to a general scheme lacking individualized suspicion
have often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level.
Finally, the State again argued that its checkpoint was justified by its
lawful secondary purpose of keeping impaired drivers off the road and
checking licenses and registration.157 Matter-of-factly, the Court appeared to
place an exclamation point behind the primary purpose, remarking that giving
merit to a secondary purpose justification would allow law enforcement
authorities to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as a
lawful check was attached, such as a license or sobriety check.158 In addition,
the Court recognized that challenges may exist in positing a purpose inquiry,
but held nonetheless that courts “routinely engage in this enterprise in many
areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive
governmental conduct from that which is lawful.”159 Moreover, despite the
reasonableness inquiry being primarily objective under the Fourth
Amendment, the special need and administrative exclusions demonstrated that
purpose may be relevant in suspicionless intrusions pursuant to general
schemes.160
The Court concluded by reaffirming that its present holding did not alter
the state of the approved checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, nor the

that by exposing his bag to the public, petitioner lost a reasonable expectation that his bag would
not be physically manipulated.” Id. The Court asked first, “whether the individual, by his
conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown that ‘he
[sought] to preserve [something] as private.’ [And ] [s]econd . . . whether the individual’s
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” Id. at 338.
The Court concluded that the petitioner intended to preserve the privacy of his bag by placing it
directly above his seat, and although a bus passenger expects other passengers or employees to
have to move the bag “for one reason or another . . . [h]e does not expect that other passengers or
bus employees will . . . feel the bag in an exploratory manner.” Id. at 338-39. The Court held
that Cantu’s “physical manipulation” of petitioner’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
339.
155. Id. at 338 n.2.
156. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46.
157. Id.
158. Id. Note that the Court’s emphasis on the primary purpose, as well as its seeming
distaste to permit a valid secondary purpose, is in clear contrast to footnote 2 of its opinion. See
infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (discussing further footnote 2).
159. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
160. Id.
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suggested lawful checkpoint in Prouse, yet such checkpoints must still balance
the interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program.161 However, when
general crime control objectives are sought, they must be justified by some
“quantum of individualized suspicion.”162 Furthermore, the Court’s holding
neither affected searches at airports or government buildings where “the need
for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute,”163 nor
impaired the ability of officers to respond to information appropriately learned
at a checkpoint justified by a lawful primary purpose.164 Finally, the Court
reinstated the principle from Whren that the purpose inquiry is only to happen
at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of
individual officers at the scene.165 Because the State conceded what its primary
purpose was, and the Court found it to be one of general crime control, lacking
individualized suspicion, the State’s program violated the Fourth Amendment
and the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed.
B.

Dissent: Keeping the Fourth Amendment Analysis “Objective”

Justices Thomas and Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, where he
stated that the Indianapolis’ checkpoint seizures served the State’s “accepted
and significant” interest of protecting the highways from drunk drivers and
verifying driver’s license and vehicle registration; and that there was nothing in
the record indicating that the use of a drug-sniffing dog lengthened the
seizures.166 Grounded in Brown, the dissent rested its opinion on two primary
arguments: first, that the majority failed to apply the clear-cut analysis set forth
by the leading roadblock cases, and second, that it added an unwarranted “nonlaw-enforcement primary purpose” prong to the Fourth Amendment analysis.
The crux of the dissent’s analysis centered on the “Brown Balancing Test.”
A roadblock seizure is constitutional if it is
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers. [There must be] a weighing of the gravity of
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.167

In both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Court balanced the State’s interest
(illegal immigrants in Martinez-Fuerte; drunk driving in Sitz), against the
objective intrusions (twenty-five seconds to five minutes) and the subjective

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
Id. at 48. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48. Justice Thomas joined Part I of the dissent only.
Id. at 49 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)).
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intrusion (minimal in both cases due to the standardized operations), and
upheld both checkpoints as effective means of advancing the States’ interest.168
Unlike the majority, which ultimately distinguished the Indianapolis
checkpoint from those in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz and Prouse by the primary
purpose, the dissent found that the present checkpoint “follow[ed] naturally”
from the leading cases.169 Regardless of the State conceding its primary
purpose was to intercept the flow of illegal narcotics, the dissent asserted that
based on the straightforward Fourth Amendment analysis, such a fact should
not be controlling:170 “Even accepting the Court’s conclusion that the
checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were not primarily related to
criminal law enforcement, the question whether a law enforcement purpose
could support a roadblock seizure is not presented in this case.”171 Applying
Edmond to the first prong of the Brown test, the dissent pointed out that the
secondary purpose for the Indianapolis checkpoint, checking for valid driver’s
licenses’ and vehicle registrations, was expressly suggested in Prouse as being
a justifiable and legitimate state interest, therefore it was irrelevant that the
petitioners also hoped to intercept drugs.172 As to the second and third Brown
prongs, the dissent found that the seizure was objectively reasonable, lasting
only two to three minutes, and subjectively reasonable, as the intrusion was
limited by clearly marked checkpoints and uniformed officers with specific
guidelines.173 The only difference then, the dissent noted, was that the present
case involved the presence of a dog; however, it had previously been held that
a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics dog did not rise to the level of a search
under the Fourth Amendment.174 The dissent’s Fourth Amendment analysis
168. Id. at 50.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 50 (footnote omitted).
172. Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1026 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 663 (1979); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51. “Once the constitutional requirements for a particular
seizure are satisfied, the subjective expectations of those responsible for it are irrelevant. Because
the objective intrusion of a valid seizure does not turn upon anyone’s subjective thoughts, neither
should our constitutional analysis.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52. The dissent relied on Whren, where
the Court held that an officer’s subjective intent would not invalidate an otherwise objective and
justifiable vehicle stop. Id. at 51-52; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1986). The
reasonableness of the vehicle stop in Whren turned on whether there was probable cause to
believe that a traffic law had been violated, and similarly the reasonableness of highway
checkpoints, in the case at bar, turns on whether such checkpoints serve a legitimate state interest
with minimal intrusion. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51-52. Just as the Whren stops were found to be
objectively reasonable, “so too the roadblocks here are objectively reasonable because they serve
the substantial interests of preventing drunken driving and checking for drivers license and
vehicle registrations with minimal intrusions on motorists.” Id.
173. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51-53.
174. Id. at 52. For a discussion of a dog “sniff” in Place, see supra note 28-29. A dog “sniff”
does not rise to the level of a search because the protection of the Fourth Amendment “protects
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concluded by mentioning the Indianapolis checkpoint success rate—forty-nine
arrests for offenses unrelated to drugs, emphasizing the fact that the State did
have a legitimate interest outside of narcotics, and therefore the stops should be
constitutional.175
Lastly, the dissent contended the majority added an unwarranted “non-lawenforcement primary purpose” prong to its Fourth Amendment analysis, a
scrutiny more appropriate in the area of searches, but not “brief roadblock
seizures.”176 The purpose prong that the Court found so “indispensable” had
previously been rejected because “seizures of automobiles ‘deal neither with
searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the
most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.’”177 The latter represents what
is termed the “special needs” doctrine, permitting limited intrusions to search a
person’s body and home, “[however] there [are] no such intrusions here.”178
The dissent argued that the traditional privacy and freedom the Fourth
Amendment protects in searches is significantly different from one’s
expectation of privacy in an automobile, because automobiles are “subjected to
pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls.”179 As a
result, the lowered expectation of privacy, along with the minimal intrusion,
equals a brief, standardized, non-intrusive seizure, and one which cannot be
compared to the intrusive search of the body or home.180 The dissent
compared the “special needs” inquiry, which serves to both define and limit the
permissible scope of those searches, with the Brown balancing test, defining
and limiting the permissible scope of automobile seizures, and concluded that
the additional purpose prong was both unnecessary to ensure Fourth

people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy.”
Place, 462 U.S. at 706-07. The information obtained through the investigative technique of a
dog’s sniff is “much less intrusive than a typical search,” and does not subject the owner of the
property to the “embarrassment [or] inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more
intrusive investigative methods.” Id. at 707.
175. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53.
176. Id. The dissent cites Martinez-Fuerte, where the Court consistently looked at “the scope
of the stop” in examining a program’s constitutionality. Id. See United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976).
177. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561). The dissent pointed
to the respondents in Sitz who argued that Brown was not the proper analysis to use for roadblock
seizure cases. Id. at 53. In Sitz the Court held that it was “perfectly plain” from Von Raab,
referring to Martinez-Fuerte, that Von Raab was “in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases
dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways.” Id. Martinez-Fuerte and Brown are
the relevant authorities. Id.; see Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990).
178. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54.
179. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
180. Id.
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Amendment rights and was bound to produce mass confusion as to the
“purpose” of a particular seizure.181
Justice Thomas did not join Part II of the dissent, proposing that MartinezFuerte and Sitz were decided incorrectly. He stated, “I rather doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered ‘reasonable’ a
program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of
wrongdoing.”182 He added, however, that because respondents failed to
propose the overruling of these leading cases, he would refrain from
considering such an argument.183
C. Author’s Analysis: Strong Start . . . But A Weak Finish for the Majority
The majority is to be commended for its holding in that it serves to protect
the privacy rights of every motorist on the road, preventing innocent
individuals from being subjected to checkpoints at the whim of law
enforcement. Even though the Court has previously expressed that the privacy
rights of innocent individuals will at times be invaded, it has also noted that
such an invasion generally is supported by at least some notion of suspicion.184
However, while the holding appears valid for policy reasons, the Court’s
analysis appears unsound when one examines the relevant precedent.
First, after drawing the line of validity at checkpoints established for
general criminal law enforcement purposes, the line begins to thin at what is
considered protecting society and pure general criminal enforcement. The
Court used the former reason to uphold the state’s actions in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz, and the latter to strike down the present checkpoint. Yet, as the
dissent pointed out, prohibiting the flow of illegal drugs into the country
undoubtedly serves to protect society, both young and old. The Court seems to
use Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz to lay the foundation as to what valid “primary
purposes” are; even still, while the transportation of illegal aliens and sobriety
checks are relevant, the more pressing issue is why the Court upheld them. It
may be argued that the cases were not upheld because the interests presented
were the primary purpose, but rather because the state’s interests were
legitimate and pressing. While immigration issues and drunk driving are
present concerns, there can be no doubt that drugs in this country is, too, a
viable concern that must haunt every law enforcement agency in the country.
As portrayed by the media, drugs are everywhere; from the oldest citizen to the

181. Id.
182. Id. at 56.
183. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56.
184. The Seventh Circuit in Goldsmith II identified at least four situations in which the
innocent individual may be intruded upon where there is a basis for law enforcement to believe
that a particular search or seizure, distinct from a random or general search or seizure, will yield
evidence of a crime. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999).
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youngest child on the playground, and the urgency of police departments in
trying to combat this enemy any way they know how can be understood, or at
minimum, should be a sufficient and legitimate enough interest to stand on its
own without conforming to Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz. However, as stated
above, in combating this war on drugs, every citizen driving a car should not
be subjected to the efforts of the law enforcement in controlling the enemy.
There must be limits, boundaries and guidelines.
Second, as both the majority and dissent cite Whren as standing for the
proposition that the subjective intentions of officers do not play a role in the
Fourth Amendment analysis, the majority is correct in asserting that Whren
does not preclude inquiry into the purpose of a checkpoint. Yet, it is unclear
how this crucial “primary” factor became concrete, or justified by precedent.
Regarding Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz and Prouse, the majority states:
[E]ach of the checkpoint programs that [it has] approved [were] designed
primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the
border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary
purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth
Amendment.185

In fact, though the word “primary” is not even mentioned in MartinezFuerte,186 and only brought up in a footnote in Sitz during the testimony of the
commander of the Michigan State Police Department concerning his purpose
in effectuating the checkpoint program, this was not relied upon by the
Court.187
The Court began to unravel the legitimacy of Indianapolis checkpoint
simply because each of the other programs it had upheld dealt with problems
“closely related” to policing the border and ensuring roadway safety. Yet the
reality of the situation is that there have only been two cases, decided in 1976
and 1990, concerning the types of checkpoints which are legitimate. It seems
unreasonable that in the year 2001, an age where one of the most pressing
concerns facing our society is illegal narcotics, this problem could not be

185. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
186. The word “sole” precedes “purpose” in one context where the Court is analyzing the
subjective intrusion on motorists. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560. The defendants arrested
suggested that they were stigmatized by being referred to the secondary inspection area, but the
Court stated that the defendants overstated the consequences.
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into
residence status that cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the traffic is heavy.
Moreover, selective referrals rather than questioning the occupants of every car tend to
advance some Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 470-72 n.13 (1990).
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considered “closely related” to the primary purposes in the leading cases.188
Consequently, the State has the stronger argument as to how the checkpoints at
issue can be reconciled with Martinez-Fuerte. While drivers “high” on drugs
may not be a grave concern, compared to the drunk drivers in Sitz, it might be
argued that it is relatively well-known that most drugs are smuggled into the
country, resembling Martinez-Fuerte. As for Whren, it is not clear whether the
Court is ingenious or unwise for contending that because inquiry was irrelevant
only to the subjective intentions of the officer, inquiry into the programmatic
purpose is allowed.189 The ingenuity comes if the Court was attempting to find
any way to strike down the checkpoint, but the imprudence is revealed if
Whren’s openness is later used to justify the Court creating further limitations
to vehicle checkpoints.
Finally, in what is perhaps the most damaging part of the Court’s opinion,
the constant focus upon the newfound “primary” purpose analysis leaves the
door wide open for an influx of cases where states have set up checkpoints that
have a “secondary” purpose to, for example, stop the flow of illegal narcotics.
Almost acknowledging that this “door” has been left open, the Court maintains
in footnote 2:
[W]e need not decide whether the State may establish a checkpoint program
with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a
secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics. Specifically, we express no view
on the question whether police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety
checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.190

The questions that this “primary” purpose analysis has left are: 1) what
constitutes a “primary” purpose and who is to determine that, and 2) what
becomes of the projected footnote, where the secondary purpose of a
checkpoint program is to prevent the flow of narcotics, and the primary
purpose is to check for driver’s license and the like?
The problem presented in the first inquiry is that undoubtedly states are in
the best position to determine what is primary for them, and while the courts
acknowledge this, it is debatable that in the end, the determination of what
constitutes a primary purpose will be left up to the courts.191 While the
determination may depend upon what has been held in other jurisdictions to be
primary; it may ultimately go back to Sitz, Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse, a
worthwhile, but restricting and non-evolving view of present state concerns. It
188. The Court recognized the national policy of the United States to limit the increase of
immigration in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551. It further recognized the magnitude of drunken
driving problem in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449, 451.
189. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text (discussing Whren).
190. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2. See supra note 154 (referencing footnote 2).
191. See generally Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54 (stating that the choice among reasonable
alternatives for effectuating state interests is best left in hands of that state as they have a unique
understanding of the situation).
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is perfectly logical to conclude or at least purport that a roadblock is not the
most effective means of combating drugs, because the accident rate between
drugs and driving is probably nowhere near the caliber of drinking and driving,
but who is to say that in a city whose biggest problem is illegal drugs, many
vehicle accidents are not caused by such, that that purpose is not primary? If a
state claims eliminating illegal drugs is a legitimate interest, and it can produce
empirical data supporting its proposition, why should any court be allowed to
step in and say such an interest is essentially invalid to support a checkpoint
because it is one of general criminal law enforcement, where no individualized
suspicion exists?
As to the second inquiry, this evidences the fact that the Court has gotten
itself into a dilemma by stressing what is the primary purpose. So what of the
checkpoint that makes interdicting drugs its secondary purpose, but conducts
sobriety checks as its “primary” purpose? Simple. States will begin instituting
lawful and justifiable checkpoints all over the place to achieve the underlying
means of intercepting drugs or any other substance they deem to be a
legitimate state interest.192 Actually, it is not even clear if the secondary
purpose has to be legitimate at all. As to those courts that adopted this “mixedmotive” approach, they are the realistic consequences of the majority’s
opinion—that virtually any and every type of checkpoint will be upheld,
boundaries will be nonexistent and the power given to law enforcement will be
unstoppable. If that is the end that the majority seeks to achieve, then it has
done so with this primary purpose. To put it another way, if the majority’s
goal was to give law enforcement some power to be able to attack this war on
drugs, then it has done so rather creatively, without upsetting the controlling
precedent. But if its goal was to prevent law enforcement from being able to
set up a checkpoint for any reason, absent individualized suspicion, upsetting
the Fourth Amendment, then it has failed.
Perhaps a better way to achieve the latter would have been to eliminate the
use of the word primary altogether and assert that the only purpose for such
suspicionless checkpoints, save for the recognized exclusions, must be one of a
legitimate state interest that is not bent on “catching the bad guy,” but
furthering the safety and welfare of society. But again, it may be difficult to
argue that controlling the flow of illegal drugs does not fit into this category.
Note that this revision does not take power away from officers to be able to
seize drugs they do find, but such seizure would have to happen the old fashion
way, the way the Framers intended, based upon probable cause.
In addition, eliminating the use of the narcotics dog at the initial stop might
solve the underlying problem. The need for a narcotics dog in the airport, and
governmental buildings has been settled as valid, but according to the Court,
192. This conclusion is not a new concept. The majority in Edmond recognized the same
possibility. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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the same need does not exist at checkpoints. The rational is that the use of a
narcotics dog is for one purpose only, to find drugs. If the Court deems that
such an action is not lawful without individualized suspicion, then officers
should not use the dogs until such probable cause, and the need for the dog,
arises. This may ensure that checkpoints are set up for reasons the Court finds
lawful and justifiable, and still give officers the tools to be able to combat
drugs. For example, if a car is stopped according to a preceding plan and
specific guidelines, for a legitimate reason, and during the stop the officer has
reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle may be carrying drugs; they
may then bring the dog out to sniff the car. Even though Place asserts that a
dog “sniff” does not rise to the level of a “search” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment,193 allowing the dog to sniff the car simultaneous with the officer
checking for drugs contradicts the very essence of the Court’s opinion;
undermining the evil it is trying to prevent—giving unbridled power and
discretion to police in the area of general criminal enforcement of the law. It is
not suggested that Place was decided incorrectly, but if the Court wishes to
enforce its viewpoint that interdicting drugs requires individualized suspicion,
then as Place pertains to roadblocks, it should be reevaluated.
As for the dissent, while the checkpoint at issue should not be allowed
more for policy reasons than anything else, the merit of its opinion is pointed
out in the majority errors.
First, the dissent presents the better argument that the present case follows
naturally from the two leading roadblock cases and Brown. The majority does
not even mention the “Brown Balancing Test” in its own analysis—the
straightforward constitutional test, the very foundation of which establishes the
reasonableness of a checkpoint program. The framework set out from these
cases only requires inquiry into the state’s interest, the effectiveness of the
program in advancing that state interest and the intrusion imposed upon the
motorists.
The state interests in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, illegal aliens and drunk
driving, were considered grave, and the flow of illegal narcotics has equally
been found to be a grave concern for the States. Prong one is satisfied. Next,
turning to the effectiveness of the checkpoint, there is no argument that the
effectiveness of the Indianapolis checkpoint surpassed those percentages that
were upheld in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. Prong two is satisfied. Finally, the
level of intrusion, evaluated on both an objective and subjective level, is where
the greatest differences lay between the conflicting circuits that have heard this
issue. The objective intrusion was generally found to be minimal, but the cases
striking down the checkpoints found the subjective intrusion to be great. Had
the majority analyzed Brown, it would have been unable to successfully rely
upon the same data because those conclusions seemed to be solely based upon
193. See supra note 174.
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a handful of cases whose checkpoints were set up in a way to “trick” the
motorists into the vehicle stop,194 but in both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz and the
present case, the checkpoints were clearly marked, guidelines clearly
established and protocol clearly followed to avoid officer discretion. Prong
three is satisfied.
As the dissent recognized, the only difference between the leading cases
and the present one is the presence of a dog, but so long as the Court holds that
a dog “sniff” does not constitute a search for which individualized suspicion
would be required, and a dog is allowed to be present at legitimate and
justifiable checkpoints, then the checkpoint passes the Court’s own Brown test.
Second, though a proper argument advanced by the dissent was that the
present case did not require asking the question of whether a law enforcement
purpose could support a roadblock seizure, the more paramount argument is
that the Fourth Amendment analysis appropriate for seizures does not speak to
primary purpose.195 Such language is not present in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz or
Whren. Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were upheld because of the valid reasons for
conducting the roadblock seizures; and Whren, which the majority interpreted
as leaving open an inquiry into the programmatic purpose of a checkpoint, was
seen by both the majority and dissent as precluding the subjective intentions of
an officer from being introduced in the Fourth Amendment analysis.
Therefore, if the former two cases stand for the proposition that legitimate state
interests can support a roadblock seizure, and drug trafficking is considered
such an interest; and if Whren’s proposition is valid, that the subjective
intentions of the officers hoping to interdict drugs is irrelevant, then the present
checkpoint was sufficient to warrant a roadblock. There is no mention of
primary purpose.
Moreover, the dissent correctly cited those cases where the majority looked
to the purpose of the state’s actions,196 and those cases concerned the searches
of one’s home or business where the intrusion involved was great because the
expectation of privacy was so high. However, in the case at bar, it has been
repeatedly noted that expectation of privacy in one’s automobile is
significantly different than the above.
Finally, there may be some validity in Justice Thomas’s implication that
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were decided incorrectly. His assertion that the
Framers might not have approved of the application of the Fourth
Amendment—a tenet that affords every citizen a blanket of protection from
unreasonable intrusion into their persons or home—being diminished to a test
of reasonableness has some force behind it. Since its inception, the Fourth
Amendment has been a measure of security for the average citizen to have
194. See supra notes 146-148.
195. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53.
196. See id. at 54 (citing cases relied on by dissent).
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some control over the government, and to take that away because the seizure is
deemed reasonable seems to be yet another blow in the citizen’s shield. An
additional argument may be advanced that the two cases were decided without
due consideration as to how and where the boundaries and limits would be
drawn in determining what types of interest would be considered legitimate—
such as whether or not all subsequent cases would have to be analogized in
accord with the leading cases, or if the cases simply represent two examples of
legitimate interests. The majority seems to want to enforce the former,197 but it
seems illogical that the interests of fifty states should be forced to conform to
only two choices, created twenty-four and ten years ago, respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
A new twist on a previous scenario, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
presented the Court with a great challenge—balancing the privacy rights of its
citizens with the necessary job functions of our law enforcement. For valuable
policy reasons, the holding of the majority is the correct one. The line has to
be drawn somewhere preventing even the most valiant of law enforcement
objectives from intruding upon the rights of innocent individuals without the
pre-requisite probable cause. However, the route the majority took to reach its
conclusion is unsettling because it does not appear to be in line with the
controlling precedent.
The Fourth Amendment deems all searches and seizures unreasonable
without individualized suspicion except for the limited exclusions. The
vehicular roadblock exclusion requires that the checkpoint be of a legitimate
public interest and reasonable, and through Martinez-Fuerte and Brown, the
constitutional test for reasonableness developed. Yet, in this latest opinion, as
pointed out by the dissent, the majority does not even mention the Brown test,
but instead carves out a new crucial factor, primary purpose, a factor that has
never before been an essential element in seizure cases. The implication of
this primary purpose factor, which is essential in search cases, and now finds
its way into the seizure cases, leaves wide open the door for law enforcement
to satisfy the primary prong by one of the interests already upheld, and then
have a secondary purpose be whatever it wishes, such as interdicting illegal
narcotics.
The effects of this implication may be twofold: if the evil the Court tried to
prevent with its opinion was an unbridled discretion of law enforcement to
intrude upon the public, its goal was undermined because the secondary
purpose was left to the discretion of the police. However if emphasis of the
“primary” purpose was simply to not upset the controlling precedent, and hint
that a secondary purpose may still be used to effectuate a state’s program, then

197. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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the Court has, in a roundabout way, creatively kept the power in the hands of
law enforcement. Regardless of its intent, the Court’s silence as to the
constitutional test fashioned for these types of cases remains curiously
questionable, because strict application of Brown lends itself to an arguable
finding that the Indianapolis checkpoint should have been upheld.
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